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dc.creatorWilson, Bruce M.
dc.creatorRodríguez Cordero, Juan Carlos
dc.creatorHandberg, Roger
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-15T16:32:18Z
dc.date.available2018-01-15T16:32:18Z
dc.date.issued2004-08-05
dc.identifier.citationhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/the-best-laid-schemes-gang-aft-a-gley-judicial-reform-in-latin-america-evidence-from-costa-rica/D3D74BE61CE00F526A741C38E29BEB4C
dc.identifier.issn0022-216X
dc.identifier.issn1469-767X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10669/73857
dc.description.abstractStarting in the 1980s, and accelerating through the 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on economic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors' expectations of the judicial reforms' economic impact and the observed outcomes.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversity of Central Florida/[1-80-936/11809002]/UCF/EE.UUes_ES
dc.language.isoen_USes_ES
dc.sourceJournal of Latin American Studies, vol.36 (3), pp. 507-531es_ES
dc.subjectCosta Ricaes_ES
dc.subjectReforma Judiciales_ES
dc.subjectInstituciones Financieras Internacionaleses_ES
dc.subjectCorte Suprema de Justiciaes_ES
dc.subjectSala Constitucionales_ES
dc.titleThe Best Laid Schemes ... Gang Aft A-gley: Judicial Reform in Latin America – Evidence from Costa Ricaes_ES
dc.typeartículo original
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022216X04007771
dc.description.procedenceUCR::Vicerrectoría de Docencia::Ciencias Sociales::Facultad de Derechoes_ES


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