Pensamiento y lenguaje: el problema del límite en las investigaciones lógicas I (1900) de E. Husserl y la voz y el fenómeno (1967) de J. Derrida
Fecha
2024
Autores
Hidalgo Aguilera, Yuliana
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Esta investigación aborda la pregunta por el límite que aparece para el pensamiento y el lenguaje en la discusión por el sentido dada en Las investigaciones lógicas I (1900) de Edmund Husserl y La voz y el fenómeno (1967) de Jacques Derrida.
En el primer capítulo, se introduce el concepto de signo, este se reconstruye a partir del proyecto que se emprende en la Primera Investigación donde Husserl critica el asociacionismo psicologista y la teoría de la representación. Para esto, se abordan en la expresión una serie de distinciones esenciales que el autor asocia con la pureza del sentido. En Husserl se busca reducir el aspecto indicativo de aquel bajo la autoridad de la conciencia a sí que permite, en última instancia, la unidad de la significación en una intuición original. Procediendo de este modo, se enfatizan las condiciones en las que el sentido es para la conciencia, siguiendo una descripción del objeto lógico fenomenológico y la descripción de la correspondiente vivencia implicada en toda expresión. Esto lleva a sostener la permanencia de los pensamientos en ausencia de signos orales o escritos, y así, se alcanza la objetividad en el contenido ideal de una expresión. Finalmente, una vez lograda la esencia del fenómeno de la significación, esto implica revisar sus límites bajo la interpretación de las afirmaciones kantianas acerca del concepto de límite.
En el segundo capítulo, se discute el sentido explorando la respuesta a la investigación husserliana por parte de Derrida en La voz y el fenómeno. Para esto, se aborda el problema de las distinciones esenciales como un problema de toma de decisiones respecto a la fijación de los límites. Esto evidencia que la intuición originaria surge gracias a la institución de la presencia que ocurre en la sombra de la voz fenomenológica. Derrida revisa las condiciones de posibilidad del sentido fenomenológico y critica de este el rasgo originario de su génesis, así como su falta de compromiso con el papel de la escritura en la construcción del discurso metafísico. Las aclaraciones contra los argumentos de la propuesta husserliana terminan por incidir en la autoridad de la intuición originaria para delimitar su alcance, abriendo así la naturaleza restrictiva de la esfera de la conciencia pura. Este rebasamiento es interpretado tomando como referencia el planteamiento hegeliano sobre la concepción del límite.
En el tercer capítulo, la discusión se centra en el tratamiento del límite extraído a partir de las perspectivas de Husserl y Derrida sobre la significación. Las razones para una interpretación de la discusión entre ambos autores provienen del análisis del límite que propone Eugenio Trías en Límites del mundo (1985). Esto lleva a plantear que entre la primera investigación lógica y su revaloración derridiana, la lógica del límite tenga distintos matices en función de su alcance, epistemológico u ontológico, y que, sin embargo, ambas narrativas mantengan el concepto de límite como un valor aproximativo al ser. Para Trías es necesario darle al límite su propio ámbito, el topológico, para establecerlo como fundamento del ser
This research addresses the question of the limit that arises for thought and language in the discussion of meaning in Logical Investigations I (1900) by Edmund Husserl and Speech and Phenomena (1967) by Jacques Derrida. In the first chapter, the concept of the sign is introduced, reconstructed from the project undertaken in the First Investigation, where Husserl critiques associationist psychology and the theory of representation. To achieve this, a series of essential distinctions related to the purity of expressions are examined. Husserl seeks to reduce the indicative sense under the authority of self-consciousness, which allows for the unity of meaning in an original intuition. With this approach, he emphasizes the conditions in which meaning appears to consciousness. A description of the logical-phenomenological object, as well as the corresponding lived experience involved in every expression, leads to affirming the permanence of thoughts in the absence of oral or written signs, thus reaching objectivity in the ideal content of an expression. Finally, once the phenomenon of meaning is thematized, it also implies determining its limits, an interpretation approached through Kantian assertions regarding the concept of the limit. In the second chapter, meaning is discussed starting from Derrida's response to Husserl’s investigation in Speech and Phenomena. Here, the problem of essential distinctions is addressed as a problem of decision-making concerning the establishment of limits. This highlights that original intuition arises thanks to the institution of presence, which occurs in the shadow of the phenomenological voice. Derrida examines the conditions of possibility for phenomenological meaning and critiques the original trait of its genesis, as well as its lack of engagement with the role of writing in the construction of metaphysical discourse. His clarifications against Husserl’s arguments ultimately affect the authority of original intuition in delimiting its scope, thereby revealing the restrictive nature of the sphere of pure consciousness. This transgression is interpreted with reference to Hegel’s conception of the limit. In the third chapter, the discussion focuses on the treatment of the limit as derived from Husserl’s and Derrida’s perspectives on meaning. The rationale for an interpretation of the debate between these two authors stems from the analysis of the limit proposed by Eugenio Trías in The Limits of the World (1985). This leads to the argument that, between the First Logical Investigation and Derrida’s reassessment of it, the logic of the limit assumes different nuances depending on whether its scope is epistemological or ontological. Nevertheless, both narratives retain the concept of the limit as an approximative value to being. For Trías, it is necessary to assign the limit its own domain, the topological, in order to establish it as the foundation of being.
This research addresses the question of the limit that arises for thought and language in the discussion of meaning in Logical Investigations I (1900) by Edmund Husserl and Speech and Phenomena (1967) by Jacques Derrida. In the first chapter, the concept of the sign is introduced, reconstructed from the project undertaken in the First Investigation, where Husserl critiques associationist psychology and the theory of representation. To achieve this, a series of essential distinctions related to the purity of expressions are examined. Husserl seeks to reduce the indicative sense under the authority of self-consciousness, which allows for the unity of meaning in an original intuition. With this approach, he emphasizes the conditions in which meaning appears to consciousness. A description of the logical-phenomenological object, as well as the corresponding lived experience involved in every expression, leads to affirming the permanence of thoughts in the absence of oral or written signs, thus reaching objectivity in the ideal content of an expression. Finally, once the phenomenon of meaning is thematized, it also implies determining its limits, an interpretation approached through Kantian assertions regarding the concept of the limit. In the second chapter, meaning is discussed starting from Derrida's response to Husserl’s investigation in Speech and Phenomena. Here, the problem of essential distinctions is addressed as a problem of decision-making concerning the establishment of limits. This highlights that original intuition arises thanks to the institution of presence, which occurs in the shadow of the phenomenological voice. Derrida examines the conditions of possibility for phenomenological meaning and critiques the original trait of its genesis, as well as its lack of engagement with the role of writing in the construction of metaphysical discourse. His clarifications against Husserl’s arguments ultimately affect the authority of original intuition in delimiting its scope, thereby revealing the restrictive nature of the sphere of pure consciousness. This transgression is interpreted with reference to Hegel’s conception of the limit. In the third chapter, the discussion focuses on the treatment of the limit as derived from Husserl’s and Derrida’s perspectives on meaning. The rationale for an interpretation of the debate between these two authors stems from the analysis of the limit proposed by Eugenio Trías in The Limits of the World (1985). This leads to the argument that, between the First Logical Investigation and Derrida’s reassessment of it, the logic of the limit assumes different nuances depending on whether its scope is epistemological or ontological. Nevertheless, both narratives retain the concept of the limit as an approximative value to being. For Trías, it is necessary to assign the limit its own domain, the topological, in order to establish it as the foundation of being.