Libertad y conocimiento en Spinoza: ¿Por qué el ser humano no escapa a su propia concepción del libre albedrío?
Fecha
2025
Tipo
artículo original
Autores
Rojas Alvarado, Arturo
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Resumen
El presente escrito aborda una respuesta a la pregunta “¿Por qué el ser humano no escapa a su propia concepción del libre albedrío?” desde el pensamiento de Baruch Spinoza. Para esto, se plantea la concepción spinoziana de libre albedrío como conocimiento inadecuado, la concepción verdadera de libertad y, así, responder a la condición que impide que el ser humano escape a aquella concepción inadecuada de libertad, la cual es propiciada por las instituciones en las que vivimos con una intención de servidumbre.
The present paper addresses a response to the question “Why does the human being not escape their own conception of free will?” from the perspective of Baruch Spinoza’s thought. For this, it presents Spinoza´s conception of free will as inadequate knowledge, the true conception of freedom, and thus responds to the condition that prevents the human being from escaping this inadequate conception of freedom, which is perpetuated by the institutions in which we live with an intention of servitude.
The present paper addresses a response to the question “Why does the human being not escape their own conception of free will?” from the perspective of Baruch Spinoza’s thought. For this, it presents Spinoza´s conception of free will as inadequate knowledge, the true conception of freedom, and thus responds to the condition that prevents the human being from escaping this inadequate conception of freedom, which is perpetuated by the institutions in which we live with an intention of servitude.
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Palabras clave
Libertad, Spinozismo, Libre albedrío, Determinismo, Freedom, Spinozism, Free will, Determinism